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Abstract
This paper analyses takeovers of companies owned by atomistic shareholders and by one
minority blockholder, all of whom can only decide to tender or retain their shares. As pri-
vate benefit extraction is ineﬃcient, the post-takeover share value increases with the bidder’s
shareholdings. In a successful takeover, the blockholder tenders all his shares and the small
shareholders tender the amount needed such that the post-takeover share value matches the bid
price. Compared to a fully dispersed target company, the bidder may have to oﬀer a higher
price either to win the blockholder’s support or to attract enough shares from small shareholders.
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1 Introduction
Takeovers are considered an important check on managers of large public corporations; they allow
to remove managers who are not acting in the shareholders’ best interest. In addition, the mere
threat of a takeover disciplines managers. Since MANNE [1965] laid out the theoretical foundations
for the study of takeovers, their eﬀectiveness as a disciplinary mechanism has been questioned on
diﬀerent grounds, such as agency problems within the acquiring firm or expropriation of the target
firm’s stakeholders. GROSSMAN and HART [1980] and BRADLEY [1980] show that managers who
pursue self-serving actions need not be vulnerable to takeovers, even though — or more accurately
precisely because - ownership is widely dispersed. Being too small to aﬀect the outcome, each
shareholder tenders only if the bid price at least matches the post-takeover share value. The only
way for the acquirer to succeed in face of this free-rider problem is to oﬀer a price so high that he
does not earn a profit. Consequently, he has no incentive to launch a bid, and ineﬃcient managers
face no risk of being ousted.
Their analysis of the free-rider problem is the starting point of a large theoretical literature
exploring the dynamics of the tender oﬀer process in various settings. A prominent theme in this
literature is the role of the initial ownership structure, in particular the impact of blockholders.
Numerous papers analyze takeovers where either a bidder or the incumbent management owns an
initial stake. The role of blockholders as tendering shareholders has so far received little attention
in the theoretical literature. The present paper aims to explore this dimension of blockownership in
takeovers. To this end we analyze takeovers of firms owned by a majority of atomistic shareholders
and one minority blockholder who does not counter-bid but merely decides whether to tender or
retain his shares. Our central result is that the presence of such a “passive” minority blockholder
can force the bidder to oﬀer a higher premium compared to the case of a fully dispersed target.
How the presence of a minority blockholder who merely decides to tender or retain his shares
aﬀects the takeover outcome is also an empirically relevant question. Outside the US and UK, widely
dispersed ownership is not the prevalent organizational form, also for the largest listed corporations
(e.g., LA PORTA, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES and SHLEIFER [1999]). But even in the UK and US,
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many listed firms have a shareholder owning 5 or 10 percent of the firm’s shares.1 Faced with a
takeover attempt, target blockholders often choose not to launch a counter-bid because they lack
the financial resources or the managerial capabilities to run the firm. Furthermore, institutional
investors, such as pensions funds, are prevented from launching tender oﬀers.
In many existing takeover models, the presence of a “passive” minority blockholder does not
alter the outcome. (There are a few exceptions that we discuss later in the paper.) In our model,
it does because the blockholder’s tendering decision interacts with those of the small shareholders.
The source of this interdependence is a post-takeover incentive problem on part of the successful
bidder. As in BURKART, GROMB and PANUNZI [1998], the successful bidder can decide to divert
part of the revenues generated under his control as private benefits. Such extraction is, however,
associated with a convex deadweight loss. That is, the extraction of private benefits is ineﬃcient
and exhibits decreasing returns to scale. As the bidder owns more shares, he internalizes more of
this ineﬃciency and therefore extracts less private benefits, which implies a higher post-takeover
share value.
The positive relationship between post-takeover share value and bidder’s final holding implies
that the small shareholder’s supply in the tender oﬀer depends on the bid price and the number of
shares tendered by the blockholder. As the bid price increases, the post-takeover share value that
leaves small shareholders indiﬀerent between tendering and retaining their shares also increases,
and so must the fraction of tendered shares. If small shareholders anticipate the blockholder to
tender more shares, they will tender fewer shares to make the post-takeover share value match the
bid price.
Relative to the small shareholders, the blockholder has stronger incentives to tender his shares,
provided that the bid succeeds. Tendering additional shares increases the bidder’s final stake. This
in turn reduces the bidder’s incentives to extract private benefits, thereby increasing the value of
the large shareholder’s remaining shares. Because this incentive persists whenever the bid price
1GADOUM, LANG and YOUNG [2005] report that 59 percent of listed US firms have a blockholder owning
(directly or indirectly) at least 10 percent of the firm’s shares. For a representative sample of listed US corporations
HOLDERNESS [2005] finds that 93 percent of the firms have shareholders who own at least 5% of the company’s
shares.
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equals the post-takeover share value, the blockholder must tender his entire block in equilibrium.
Selling all shares makes the minority blockholder potentially decisive for the outcome as the
bidder’s optimal strategy is to attract as few shares as necessary to gain control. The small
shareholders’ free-rider behavior prevents the bidder from making a profit on the shares acquired
in the tender oﬀer. Hence, the bidder’s only source of profit are the private benefits which decrease
with his final holding. The blockholder being decisive can in turn matter because he also takes the
value of his block under the incumbent management into account when deciding whether to tender.
By contrast, small shareholders only compare bid price and post-takeover share value.
We compare the tender oﬀer outcomes in the presence and in the absence of a minority block-
holder. Within our framework, the optimal tender oﬀer for a fully dispersed target is such that the
bid price matches the post-takeover share value when 50% of the shares are tendered (BURKART,
GROMB and PANUNZI [1998]). Any higher oﬀer would attract more shares thereby reducing the
bidder’s private benefits, while any lower oﬀer would fail.2 The presence of a blockholder matters
if the per-share value of his minority block exceeds the post-takeover share value when 50% of the
shares are tendered. This possibility can arise for two reasons.
First, the blockholder may enjoy private benefits such that the per-share value of his block
exceeds the post-takeover share value when 50% of the shares are tendered. Therefore, the bidder
has to increase the bid price either until the blockholder favors the oﬀer as he is compensated for the
forgone private benefits, or until the oﬀer attracts enough shares (50%) from the small shareholders,
making its success independent of the blockholder’s decision. In either case, the higher bid price
increases the fraction of shares tendered and thereby reduces the bidder’s takeover gains. When
these smaller gains are not suﬃcient to cover the takeover cost, the bidder refrains from undertaking
a tender oﬀer. Thus, whenever the presence of a minority blockholder leads to higher bid price, it
also reduces the likelihood of a takeover.
Second, a bid matching the post-takeover share value when 50% of the shares are tendered may
2We focus here on equilibrium outcomes in which the tender oﬀer succeeds. Failure of a conditional tender oﬀer
can always be supported as a Nash equilibrium outcome, irrespective of the bid price and the presence of a minority
blockholder.
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be below the share value under the incumbent management.3 The increase in the bid price due
to the blockholder’s resistance may deter value decreasing-bidders who may find it too costly to
take over the firm. When a value-decreasing bidder is not deterred, the price increase reduces or
even eliminates the decrease in security benefits he brings about. Thus, minority blockholders oﬀer
protection - albeit not a complete one - against value-decreasing bidders.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 shows when, how
and to what extent a minority blockholder aﬀects the tender oﬀer outcome. Section 4 discusses the
case of value-decreasing bidders. Section 5 reviews the related literature and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a firm with an incumbent blockholder (henceforth called the incumbent, I) owning a
fraction α < 50% of shares, the remaining (1−α) being dispersed among many small shareholders.
The firm is approached by a potential acquirer (henceforth called the rival, R) who owns no shares.
To gain control R has to make a public tender oﬀer in which he attracts at least 1/2 of the shares
which all carry one vote. The shareholders can respond to R’s oﬀer by either tendering (part of)
their shares or retaining them. There are no further options or choices available to any player.
In particular, none of the existing shareholders nor any other party can launch a counter-bid.
Similarly, R cannot purchase shares on the open market or oﬀer to purchases I’s block. These
restrictions are not meant to make the model more realistic but to focus our analysis on the impact
that the distribution of target ownership has on the tender oﬀer outcome.
Initially, a risk neutral manager (M) is in charge of running the firm. If the takeover does not
materialize, M remains in control. For simplicity, we abstract from any agency problems between
M and the shareholders. Thus, M neither needs to be incited to exert some productive eﬀort
nor prevented from extracting a rent. Accordingly, there is no need to oﬀer M any salary, or
3 In case of a fully dispersed target, a value-decreasing bid can succeed against the collective interest of the
shareholders because tendering can be individually rational as a hedge against the unfavourable minority position
(BEBCHUK [1988]).
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equivalently, M ’s compensation including possible private benefits that he may receive in a richer
model are normalized to zero. UnderM ’s control shareholders obtain security benefits vI per share.
We allow for the possibility that I enjoys private benefits. Some of the most compelling evidence
of private benefits comes from studies documenting that (minority) blocks trade at a considerable
premium relative to the share value after the announcement of the block trade (NENOVA [2003],
and DYCK and ZINGALES [2004]). These benefits can come from diﬀerent sources. They may take
the form of transactions with related parties, expropriation of corporate opportunities or excessive
consultant fees, all at the expense of the small shareholders. Alternatively, they may be the power
and prestige that is associated with the control over a firm and the influence it may give over
social and political events. Such “amenity potential” does not dilute the small shareholders’ claims
(DEMSETZ and LEHN [1985]).
Our interest is the possible impact of I’s private benefits on the takeover outcome rather than
its source.4 Therefore, we assume that I obtains private benefits Λ ≥ 0. This reduced-form specifi-
cation allows us to encompass diﬀerent degrees of conflicts between insiders and small shareholders.
For Λ = 0, I and the small shareholders have congruent interests. As Λ increases, their interests
diverge and I behaves increasingly like an insider with little equity interest. Suﬃciently large values
of Λ are best viewed as I managing the firm himself. We denote the total per-share value of I’s
block as υ = vI + Λ/α.
The sequence of events in the tender oﬀer unfolds as follows.
In stage 1, R makes a take-it-or-leave-it, conditional, unrestricted tender oﬀer; he submits a
price b at which he has to buy all tendered shares, provided that he receives at least 1/2 the shares.
In addition, R must pay a cost c > 0, reflecting the expenses of searching for a suitable target and
preparing the bid.5
In stage 2, the shareholders simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide whether to tender.
4BURKART and PANUNZI [2004] and BURKART, PANUNZI and SHLEIFER [2003] provide explicit models of
private benefit extraction both by the manager and by a coalition of manager and blockholder. Endogenous private
benefit extraction by I in collusion with M would not alter our qualitative results.
5As the takeover outcome is certain in our setting, it is irrelevant whether the costs accrue before or after the
takeover (in stage 1 or 3).
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While I is aware that his decision may aﬀect the outcome, small shareholders are assumed to be
homogeneous and atomistic: they do not perceive themselves as pivotal for the outcome of the
tender oﬀer. Denote by γ ∈ [0, α] the fraction of shares tendered by I and by η ∈ [0, 1 − α] that
tendered by the small shareholders.
In stage 3, if less than 1/2 the shares are tendered, the oﬀer fails and the status-quo prevails.
Otherwise, R gains control and holds β ≥ 1/2 of the shares. In that case, R decides how to allocate
the firm’s resources: they may be used to generate security benefits which accrue to all shareholders
or private benefits which only R enjoys. This non-contractible decision is modelled as R’s choice
of φ ∈ [0, 1] such that security benefits are (1− φ)vR while private benefits are (φ− l(φ))vR. The
function l(φ) represents the deadweight loss associated with private benefits extraction.
Assumption 1 The loss function l(·) is strictly increasing and convex on [0, 1], with l(0) = 0,
l0(0) = 0 and l0(1) > 1.
As in BURKART, GROMB and PANUNZI [1998] and SHLEIFER and WOLFENZON [2002],
the extraction of private benefits is ineﬃcient and its marginal return decreases. In addition, private
benefit extraction aﬀects all shares equally.
3 Tender Oﬀers and Minority Blockholders
The tender oﬀer game is analyzed by backward induction: share values in case of a successful
takeover, the equilibrium outcome for a given bid, and the resulting optimal bidding strategy are
derived in turn. Finally, the tender oﬀer outcomes in the presence of a minority blockholder are
compared to the outcomes when target ownership is fully dispersed.
3.1 Resource Allocation and Shareholder Wealth
Consider first the case where the takeover bid succeeds and R owns a fraction β ≥ 1/2 of shares. R
is entitled to a fraction β of the cash flow and can decide the fraction of resources φ allocated to his
exclusive benefits. As the extraction of private benefits entails a deadweight loss l(φ), R chooses φ
to maximize his payoﬀ
β(1− φ)vR + (φ− l(φ))vR.
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Denote by φβ the solution to the first-order condition (1− β) = l0(φ). Assumption 1 ensures that
φβ is interior and decreases with the shareholding β. When choosing φ, the bidder ineﬃciently
reduces the value of both his and the minority shares. As β increases, the bidder internalizes more
of the ineﬃciency and extracts less private benefits, which in turn leads to higher security benefits.
Lemma 1 As β increases, R’s private benefits (φβ− l(φβ))vR decrease and the post-takeover share
value (1− φβ)vR increases.
If the takeover fails (β < 1/2), M continues to run the firm. Small shareholder wealth is vI
and I’s block is worth υ ≥ vI per share. We will refer to a (successful) bid as value-increasing if it
results in R holding β such that
(1− φβ)vR ≥ vI .
For the time being, we restrict attention to parameter constellations such that any successful bid
is value-increasing.
Assumption 2 (1− φ1/2)vR ≥ vI .
We will relax this assumption in Section 4 where we discuss the case of potentially value-
decreasing bids.
3.2 Tendering and Bid Price
We now derive the tendering behavior of shareholders, large and small, for a given bid price.
In the rational expectations equilibrium outcomes, each shareholder forms expectations bα and bη
about the fraction tendered by I and by the small shareholders, and hence about the bidder’s final
shareholding, i.e., βˆ = bα + bη. In equilibrium, these expectations must coincide with the actual
outcome.
As we will see, two equilibrium outcomes can arise for some bids: one in which the bid succeeds
and one in which it fails. In such instances, we select (somewhat arbitrarily) the outcome with
the highest payoﬀ for the small shareholders. We refer to the equilibrium outcome selected in this
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manner as the dominant equilibrium outcome.6
To describe the equilibrium outcome as a function of the bid price, we define:
b∗ ≡ max
n
(1− φ1/2)vR ; min
n
υ ; (1− φ1/2+α)vR
oo
.
Proposition 1 For all bids b, there exists a single dominant rational expectations equilibrium
outcome.
(i) For b < b∗, the bid fails.
(ii) For b ∈ [b∗, vR], the bid succeeds.
• The blockholder tenders all his shares (γ = α).
• The small shareholders tender a fraction η of shares such that b = (1− φα+η)vR.
(iii) For b > vR, the bid succeeds and all shares are tendered.
In the remainder of this subsection we derive the proposition.
Lemma 2 For all bids b, failure is a rational expectations equilibrium outcome.
With conditional oﬀers and atomistic shareholders, failure of the tender oﬀer is always an
equilibrium, irrespective of the oﬀered bid price. Suppose that no shares are tendered. A non-
tendering shareholder has then no incentive to tender, as the oﬀer would still fail: an individual
atomistic shareholder’s decision cannot alter the tender oﬀer outcome, and the blockholder is too
small to reverse the outcome on his own.7
We now determine for each bid whether success can also be an equilibrium outcome and, if yes,
whether it dominates failure from the small shareholders’ perspective. We begin with two features
that all successful bids have in common.
6An alternative may be to select the equilibrium with the highest payoﬀ for I. We discuss this alternative in
footnote 11.
7While unconditional oﬀers typically avoid problems of multiple equilibrium outcomes, they lead to problems of
non-existence of equilibrium (BAGNOLI and LIPMAN [1988]).
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Lemma 3 In any equilibrium in which the bid succeeds, it must be that b ≥ (1− φβ)vR.
Given that small shareholders own more than 50% of the shares, a bid cannot succeed unless
it induces (some of) them to tender. If the bid price is below the post-takeover share value, no
atomistic shareholder will tender. This implies that the well-known free-riding condition must
always be satisfied for a takeover to succeed. That is, the bid must not be below the post-takeover
share value, which we have shown to be (1− φβ)vR (Lemma 1).
The second feature of any successful bid concerns I’s tendering behavior which is specific to the
setting with endogenous private benefit extraction and central to our paper.
Lemma 4 In any equilibrium in which the bid succeeds, it must be that I sells his entire block.
Proof: If R’s bid succeeds, I’s payoﬀ is πI = γb+(α− γ)(1−φγ+η)vR. Since b− (1− φγ+η)vR ≥ 0
(Lemma 3) and ∂φγ+η/∂γ < 0 (Lemma 1),
∂πI
∂γ
= b− (1− φγ+η)vR + (α− γ)
∂
£
(1− φγ+η)vR
¤
∂γ
> 0.
Therefore, γ = α is optimal for I. Q.E.D.
If I were to own some shares following a successful bid, he would have an incentive to tender
additional shares. On the one hand, he would make a non-negative profit on these tendered shares
(b ≥ (1− φβ)vR by Lemma 3). On the other hand, the shares that he would retain would increase
in value because the additional tendered shares increase R’s shareholdings β, leading to a higher
post-takeover share value (Lemma 1).
Lemma 4 bears some resemblance to the result of HOLMSTRÖM and NALEBUFF [1992] that
investors holding more shares have greater incentives to tender. In their model with a finite number
of shareholders, a blockholder increases the chance of success by tendering some shares, thereby
increasing the (expected) value of his retained shares. This additional gain from tendering decreases
as the number of retained shares becomes smaller. As a result, a blockholder will only tender part
of his shareholdings in equilibrium. In the present model, the post-takeover incentive problem on
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part of the bidder leads the blockholder to sell all his shares in equilibrium.8
Lemma 5 For all bids b < b∗, failure is the only rational expectations equilibrium outcome.
Proof: First, a successful bid with b < (1−φ1/2)vR would imply β < 1/2 (Lemma 3), a contradiction.
Second, suppose that a bid with b < min{υ; (1− φ1/2+α)vR} succeeds. In this case I’s payoﬀ when
tendering is αb. If I retained his shares instead, the bid would fail. Indeed, β < 1/2 + α (Lemma
3) and η = β − α (Lemma 4) imply η < 1/2. As I’s payoﬀ in that case is αυ > αb, he is better oﬀ
retaining his shares, which is a contradiction (Lemma 4). Q.E.D.
Given that b∗ = max{(1−φ1/2)vR ; min{υ ; (1−φ1/2+α)vR}}, two cases need to be distinguished.
First, if a bid b < b∗ = (1− φ1/2)vR were to succeed, shareholders would rationally anticipate 50%
or more of the shares to be tendered. With R’s shareholding β exceeding 50%, the post-takeover
share value would exceed (1 − φ1/2)vR, and a fortiori exceed the bid price b. Anticipating this,
small shareholders would all refrain from tendering. Since together they hold more than 50% of the
shares, the bid would fail. This contradicts the premise of success being an equilibrium outcome.
Second, suppose that a bid b < b∗ = min{υ; (1 − φ1/2+α)vR} were anticipated to succeed.9 In
that case, I would expect to make a loss on all the shares he tendered as b < υ. Due to the small
shareholders’ free-riding behavior, the anticipated post-takeover share value would not exceed b,
and I would also realize a loss on the retained shares. Hence, I would prefer the oﬀer to fail. Since
b < (1 − φ1/2+α)vR, R’s post-takeover shareholding must be less than 1/2 + α. Moreover, as I
must be anticipated to tender all his shares (Lemma 4), small shareholders must be anticipated to
tender less than 50% of the shares. This renders I pivotal to the bid’s success. Since he makes a
loss in the successful bid, he will not tender, thereby breaking success as an equilibrium outcome.
In conclusion, a bid has to satisfy the restrictions imposed by the large and the small sharehold-
ers’ tendering behavior in order to succeed. One the one hand, the bid must satisfy the free-rider
condition b = (1− φβ)vR in order to induce enough small shareholders to tender their shares. On
8According to CADSBY and MAYNES [1998], partial tendering strategies are the norm in experiments but are
rarely observed in the real world, where shareholders choose to tender either all or none of their shares.
9Since (1− φ1/2)vR < (1− φ1/2+α)vR this case arises if and only if υ ≥ (1− φ1/2)vR.
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the other hand, a bid must either be favoured by I (b ≥ υ) or not depend on I’s approval by at-
tracting the necessary majority (50%) of shares from the small shareholders (b ≥ (1− φ1/2+α)vR).
Otherwise, I is both decisive for the outcome and prefers the status quo and will consequently let
the bid fail by retaining his block. Bids below b∗ violate (at least) one of these constraints and
therefore cannot succeed in a rational expectations equilibrium.
There only remains to prove parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1.
Lemma 6 For all bids b ∈ [b∗, vR], γ = α and b = (1−φα+η)vR is the only equilibrium outcome in
which the bid succeeds. From the small shareholders’ perspective, this outcome dominates failure.
The rational expectations equilibrium with b ∈ [b∗, vR] requires that β = βˆ and that shareholders
be ex-ante indiﬀerent between tendering and retaining their shares. The latter condition implies
that the bid has to be equal to the expected post-takeover share value. Suppose to the contrary, that
either b > (1−φβˆ)v or b < (1−φβˆ)v. In the former case non-tendering shareholders would be better
oﬀ accepting the oﬀer, while in the latter case tendering shareholders would be better oﬀ retaining
their shares. Together with the result that I must tender all his shares, i.e., bγ = α (Lemma 4), this
implies that the only rational expectation consistent with success is bη such that b = (1− φα+bη)vR.
This is indeed an equilibrium outcome as small shareholders with these expectations are indiﬀerent
between tendering or and retaining their shares. So tendering a fraction bη is (weakly) optimal.
As regards I’s tendering behavior, two non mutually exclusive cases must be considered.
Case 1: b ≥ (1−φ1/2+α)vR. In that case, R’s anticipated post-takeover shareholdings bβ must exceed
1/2 + α and so the small shareholders must be anticipated to tender bη ≥ 1/2. These expectations
imply that I is not pivotal for the outcome. The oﬀer succeeds even if I were to retain all his
shares. Hence, I anticipates the oﬀer to succeed and his payoﬀ to be
πI = γb+ (α− γ)(1− φγ+bη)vR.
As this payoﬀ increases with γ (Lemma 4), the proposed outcome is indeed an equilibrium outcome.
Moreover, it dominates failure from the small shareholders’s perspective. Their payoﬀ is (1 −
φ1/2+α)vR which by Assumption 2 exceeds the share value under the incumbent management.
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Case 2: b ≥ υ. In that case, I is also better oﬀ when the oﬀer succeeds. Irrespective of whether
he is pivotal (η < 1/2) or not, I will find it optimal to tender all his shares since for all γ < α,
b > (1−φγ+bη)vR. Again this equilibrium dominates failure from the small shareholders’ perspective
because b ≥ υ ≥ vI .
Lemma 7 For all bids b > vR, all shares are tendered in the only equilibrium outcome in which
the bid succeeds. From the small shareholders’ perspective, this outcome dominates failure.
If shareholders anticipate that an oﬀer b > vR will succeed, they will all tender because the
post-takeover value is strictly below the bid price, i.e., for all β, (1− φβ)vR ≤ vR < b. Hence, the
only potential rational expectation is bβ = 1. Since bβ = 1 implies that the bid succeeds, β = 1 is the
only equilibrium outcome in case of success. It also dominates failure, the only other equilibrium
outcome, because b > vR > (1− φ1/2)vR ≥ vI , the small shareholders’ payoﬀ in case of failure.
Before moving on, it is worth pointing out that only the equilibrium outcome of stage 2 has been
determined, but not the small shareholders’ equilibrium strategies. For instance, the equilibrium
outcome obtains when small shareholders behave symmetrically, each tendering his shares with
probability η and retaining them with (1 − η). Provided that the law of large numbers holds,
exactly a fraction η of shares held by the small shareholders is tendered in equilibrium.
3.3 Optimal Bid
We turn now to the analysis of R’s optimal bid.
Proposition 2 If R makes a tender oﬀer in equilibrium, he bids b∗.
Proof: We know b ≥ b∗. R’s payoﬀ from a successful takeover is πR = β[(1 − φβ)vR − b] + (φβ −
l(φβ))vR − c. For b ∈ [b∗, vR], b = (1 − φβ)vR (Lemma 3) so that πR = (φβ − l(φβ))vR − c ≥ −c
which is decreasing in β (Lemma 1) and therefore in b. Finally, b > vR is suboptimal as it implies
β = 1 (Proposition 1), φβ = 0 and ultimately πR < −c. Q.E.D.
Because of the free-rider problem, R cannot make a gain on the tendered shares, and the private
benefits are his only source of profit. Since private benefit extraction entails a convex deadweight
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loss, a larger stake after the takeover leads to smaller private benefits and smaller takeover gains.
We have established that the equilibrium supply of shares in successful oﬀers increases with the bid
price (Proposition 1). Therefore, R finds it optimal to bid the lowest price ensuring success, i.e.,
to set b = b∗.
3.4 The Eﬀect of a Blockholder
In the case of a fully dispersed ownership (α = 0), R aims at attracting exactly 1/2 shares,
the minimum amount required to obtain control. The post-takeover share value is then equal to
(1−φ1/2)vR and this is also the bid that R must oﬀer to induce shareholders to tender half of their
shares (BURKART, GROMB and PANUNZI [1998]).
Proposition 3 Relative to the case of a fully dispersed ownership (α = 0), the presence of a
minority blockholder aﬀects the equilibrium outcome as follows.
(i) For υ ≤ (1− φ1/2)vR, the blockholder has no impact on the outcome.
(ii) For υ > (1− φ1/2)vR, the presence of a blockholder implies:
• A higher bid price and post-takeover share value in case of a takeover;
• A lower takeover probability.
Proof: For α = 0, b∗ = max{(1−φ1/2)vR;min{υ; (1−φ1/2)vR}} = (1−φ1/2)vR. For υ ≤ (1−φ1/2)vR,
b∗ = max{(1 − φ1/2)vR; υ} = (1 − φ1/2)vR. Hence, I has no impact. For υ > (1 − φ1/2)vR,
b∗ = max{(1−φ1/2)vR;min{υ; (1−φ1/2+α)vR}} > (1−φ1/2)vR. Compared to the case with α = 0,
this leads to a larger β and hence to a higher post-takeover share value (Lemma 1). The associated
lower profits for R in turn imply a lower probability of a takeover. Q.E.D.
A bid matching the post-takeover share value when 50% of the shares are tendered (b = (1 −
φ1/2)vR) also succeeds in the presence of I if this value exceeds the per-share value of the block
under the incumbent management ((1 − φ1/2)vR > υ). Given that all bids are value-increasing
(Assumption 2), this case obtains when I enjoys no or little private benefits. Large and small
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shareholders benefit alike from the takeover. The bid succeeds with I selling his entire block α
and small shareholders tendering 50%− α shares. Although I’s tendering decision is decisive, his
presence does not aﬀect the takeover outcome: the bidder oﬀers the same bid price to acquire the
same fraction of shares (50%) as he does when the target is fully dispersed.
The presence of I matters if, due to (substantial) private benefits, the per-share value of his
block exceeds the post-takeover share value when 50% of the shares are tendered. In this case an
oﬀer can only succeed if the blockholder either prefers success to failure or is not decisive. This
constraint requires the bidder to increase the bid price until either the blockholder favours the oﬀer
or the oﬀer attracts enough shares (50%) from the small shareholders. A larger minority stake
and larger private benefits increase the bid premium that a bidder has to oﬀer to succeed. From
the small shareholders’ perspective, such blockholder resistance comes with the benefit of higher
takeover premia but also with the cost of a reduced takeover likelihood.10 ,11
To recapitulate the intuition of a “passive” minority blockholder’s role, consider the three
reasons why the blockholder has a diﬀerent tendering strategy than the small shareholders.
First, to the extent that I enjoys private benefits Λ > 0 under M ’s control, he values the status
quo more highly than the small shareholders. Consequently, there may be bids whose success is in
the collective interest of the small shareholders but not in I’s interest.
10The empirical research on the impact of managerial and outside blockownership oﬀers conflicting findings. For
instance, STULZ, WALKLING and SONG [1990] document that institutional ownership aﬀects the target’s gain
negatively, conflicting with the findings of GASPAR, MASSA and MATOS [2005]. MIKKELSON and PARTCH
[1989] and SONG and WALKLING [1993] show that targets have lower managerial ownership than non-targets,
while AMBROSE and MEGGINSON [1992] find that neither managerial ownership nor institutional holdings are
related to takeover likelihood.
11We have selected the outcome with the highest payoﬀ for the small shareholders. An alternative criterion would
have been to select the outcome that maximizes the blockholder’s payoﬀ. Under this alternative criterion, our main
results would still hold. Specifically, Propositions 1-3 would hold with b∗ ≡ max{(1 − φ1/2)vR ; υ}. The diﬀerence
would be that the bid must be attractive to the blockholder in order to succeed. Attracting 50% of the shares from the
small shareholders would no longer be suﬃcient. Moreover, our selection criterion is biased against the blockholder
having an impact on the tender oﬀer outcome. Finally, consider the case υ > vR. For b ∈ (vR, υ), the alternative
criterion would have the undesirable property of selecting the failure equilibrium outcome, in which at least some
small shareholders play a dominated strategy.
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Second, I can be pivotal in some circumstances (whenever the fraction of shares tendered by
small shareholders, η, falls in the range [12 − α,
1
2)). In those cases - when deciding whether to
tender his shares - I compares their value under R’s control not only to the bid price but also to
their current value υ = vI +Λ/α. Pre-takeover share value can thus have an impact on the success
of the tender oﬀer, contrary to the case where ownership is fully dispersed.
Third, conditional on the bid being successful, I has a higher willingness to tender than small
shareholders. In fact, I tenders all his shares in any successful bid because he internalizes the
appreciation of the untendered shares due to the increase in R’s final stake. As small shareholders
base their decision to tender on the post-takeover share value which itself depends on the fraction of
shares tendered, I’s tendering decision aﬀects their tendering decision. It is therefore impossible for
R to simply by-pass I and attract 50% shares from small shareholders.12 To win control, the bidder
must induce both the blockholder and (a fraction of) the small shareholders to tender. Because of
I’s reluctance to tender, R is forced to increase the price oﬀered in order to be successful.
4 (Potentially) Value-decreasing Bidders
So far, we have abstracted from value-decreasing oﬀers which have received some attention in
the literature. The main issue is that an equilibrium outcome might exist in which such an oﬀer
succeeds even though all shareholders would fare better if it failed. The reason is that facing a value-
decreasing bid, dispersed shareholders may confront a “pressure-to-tender” problem: tendering may
be individually rational to avoid being in a less favorable minority position (see e.g. BEBCHUK
[1988]). In this section, we show how the presence of a passive minority blockholder can mitigate
this problem.13
12As we discuss in Section 5, this is possible if post-takeover share value and private benefits are exogenous,
rendering the presence of a “passive” minority blockholder immaterial for the outcome of the tender oﬀer.
13One might wonder how likely such value-decreasing bids are. Two remarks may be in order. First, while value-
decreasing oﬀers are probably unlikely with cash bids, they may be more realistic when the means of payment include
stocks or other harder to value financial assets. Second, although our analysis assumes a single bidder, it extends
unchanged to the case of a second bidder without private benefits (see GROSSMAN and HART [1988]). There, a
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Analyzing this issue in the context of our model requires making a couple of adjustments.
First, we need to relax Assumption 2 to consider the possibility that bids below the status quo
share value succeed, i.e., (1 − φ1/2)vR < vI . Second, “pressure-to-tender” equilibria are Pareto-
dominated by failure, and are therefore eliminated by our selection criterion. In the rest of this
section, we consider these equilibrium outcomes. Technically, this amounts to selecting success as
the equilibrium outcome for all b ≥ b∗.
The arguments we have developed do not rely on Assumption 2, except those relating to equi-
librium selection. Therefore, most results hold unchanged: Failure is an equilibrium outcome for all
bid prices (Lemma 2), and for b ≥ b∗, another equilibrium outcome exists in which the bid succeeds
(Proposition 1). As before, the raider finds it optimal to bid b = b∗ to attract the minimum amount
of shares ensuring success and maximize private benefits (Proposition 2).
From our previous analysis it is immediate that the presence of a minority blockholder forces a
(potentially) value-decreasing bidder to raise his bid. Given success is selected as the equilibrium
for all bids b ≥ b∗, b∗ = (1− φ1/2)v is the optimal oﬀer of a value-decreasing bidder in the absence
of a blockholder. As in Proposition 3, the blockholder matters if the per-share value of his minority
block (υ ≥ vI) exceeds the post-takeover share value when 50% of the shares are tendered. This
always holds in the case of a value-decreasing bidder who is defined by (1−φ1/2)vR < vI . To succeed
the bidder must therefore increase the bid price until the blockholder favours the oﬀer (b = υ) or
the oﬀer attracts 50% of shares from dispersed shareholders (b = (1−φ1/2+α)vR), whichever comes
first.
The higher bid price translates into a greater supply of shares in equilibrium. The larger stake
in turn induces the bidder to internalize more of the change in security benefits that he brings
about. This has several eﬀects. First, a bidder who would decrease security benefits but enjoy
large private benefits might find it too costly to take over the firm (deterrence eﬀect). Second,
when a bidder is not deterred, a larger stake reduces the decrease in security benefits which he
brings about (improvement eﬀect). This reduction might possibly be so large as to become a value
value-decreasing oﬀer is not necessarily below the no takeover share value, but below the share value following a
takeover by the rival, which may be harder to value.
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improvement (redemption eﬀect). All three eﬀects increase shareholder wealth. While this increase
is accentuated by the blockholder’s private benefits prior to the takeover, it does not rely on such
benefits. Indeed, b∗ > (1− φ1/2)vR even if υ = vI (which is equivalent to Λ = 0).
5 Relation to the Literature
The present paper belongs to the takeover literature that considers targets with less than fully
dispersed ownership structures. One strand shows that tender oﬀers can be profitable when the
target has a finite number of shareholders (BAGNOLI and LIPMAN [1988] and HOLMSTRÖM and
NALEBUFF [1992]). Each shareholder takes into account that his decision may be pivotal, rather
than negligible, for the outcome. Hence, he is willing to tender at a price below the post-takeover
share value, leaving the bidder some profits. Another strand of this literature argues that a bidder
who owns a stake in the target prior to the bid can earn a profit even if the target’s ownership
is otherwise fully dispersed (GROSSMAN and HART [1980], SHLEIFER and VISHNY [1986] and
CHOWDHRY and JEGADEESH [1994]). While the bidder does not make a profit on the shares
acquired in the tender oﬀer, he collects the value improvement of his initial stake.14 A pre-takeover
stake can also aﬀect the bidder’s behavior in bidding contests, e.g., make him bid more aggressively
(BURKART [1995], SINGH [1998] and BULOW, HUANG and KLEMPERER [1999]).
A third strand shows that blockownership by incumbent management can be important for
the outcome of a takeover. When the incumbent has a majority of the votes a control transfer
can only occurs with his consent. Transactions of majority (voting) blocks necessarily benefit
buyer and seller, but may have a positive or negative impact on small shareholders (KAHAN
[1993] and BEBCHUK [1994]). When the incumbent owns a large minority block,15 control can be
transferred either through a (hostile) tender oﬀer or through a block trade. BURKART, GROMB
and PANUNZI [2000] show that both incumbent and new controlling party prefer to trade the
14KYLE and VILA [1991] show that noise trading allows the bidder to acquire an initial stake on the open market
at favourable prices so that a takeover can become profitable.
15Control over a firm does not necessarily require a majority of votes. In particular, when the remaining shares
are dispersed, a minority block may be suﬃcient. For instance, neither the Ford nor the Wallenberg families own a
majority of votes.
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block because it excludes the small shareholders from a larger share of the takeover gains. STULZ
[1988] considers an incumbent manager who owns a block of voting shares and values control so
highly that he never tenders. The supply of the remaining dispersely held shares is upward sloping
because small shareholders have heterogeneous opportunity costs of tendering. As the managerial
block increases, the bidder needs to oﬀer a higher premium in order to attract the required larger
fraction of the dispersely held shares. FERREIRA, ORNELAS and TURNER [2005] show that
large managerial blockownership can preclude eﬃcient control transfers. In their complete contract
framework, asymmetric information about managerial talent coupled with ineﬃcient extraction of
private benefits generate resistance to control changes. As the managerial block increases, the
surplus generated by a control transfer decreases, thereby reducing the rents available to induce
managers not to resist.
Many of these (and other) takeover models assume that the post-takeover minority share value
and the private benefits of control are exogenous. This assumption implies that the presence of a
“passive” minority blockholder is immaterial for the tender oﬀer outcome. In order to succeed, the
bidder must induce enough small shareholders to tender. Because of the free-rider problem, small
shareholders tender only if the bid price at least matches the post-takeover share value, which is
given and independent of the bidder’s final shareholdings. The blockholder’s tendering decision is
irrelevant, as he is not decisive, owning a non-blocking minority stake.
For the presence of a “passive” minority blockholder to matter, one must depart from the
standard model’s property that the supply of shares by small shareholders is perfectly elastic (at
the exogenous post-takeover share value). Instead, one needs an upward sloping supply function. In
our model, this property is generated by the endogenous private benefits extraction. Alternatives
include models with atomistic but heterogenous shareholders, and models with a finite number of
shareholders.
If the small shareholders’ opportunity costs of tendering diﬀer due to varying liquidity needs or
tax-rates, the supply of shares in the tender oﬀer is upward sloping (STULZ [1988] and STULZ,
WALKLING and SONG [1990]).16 In such a setting, the presence of minority blockholder can
16An upward sloping expected supply curve can also obtain if the shareholders’ (common) opportunity costs of
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aﬀect the equilibrium bid price. For example, if the blockholder has the highest opportunity cost
of tendering, the bid securing a 50% supply of the shares increases. Furthermore, a blockholder
opposed to a takeover, i.e., with the highest opportunity cost, never tenders his shares even if the
bid succeeds. In the present model, a blockholder who is opposed to the bid always sell his shares
if the bid succeeds.
In a setting with a finite number of shareholders, a blockholder’s tendering strategy diﬀers from
that of the small shareholders.17 As pointed out in the discussion of Lemma 4, the logic of the finite
number of shareholder model suggests that large shareholders tender some but not all their shares
in equilibrium. Beyond this insight, the impact of a minority blockholder on the takeover outcome
is an open question, as this literature has yet to derive a mapping of ownership concentration (block
size) into equilibrium bid prices.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that the presence of a “passive” minority blockholder who does not counter-
bid but merely decides whether or not to tender can lead to a higher bid price. The result is
driven by the ineﬃcient extraction of private benefits which entails that the post-takeover share
value increases with the bidder’s final holding. The positive relationship implies that the small
shareholders’ supply in the tender oﬀer increases with the bid price but decreases with the number
of shares tendered by the blockholder. It also means that the blockholder tenders his entire block
in an equilibrium in which the bid succeeds. As a result, the blockholder is potentially decisive for
the outcome of the tender oﬀer which matters if he values the status quo highly. In this case, the
bidder must oﬀer a higher price either to win the blockholder’s support or to attract enough shares
from the small investors so that this support is no longer needed. This benefits small shareholders,
provided that the takeover is actually launched. Moreover, the presence of a “passive” minority
blockholder represents a partial safeguard against value-decreasing bids.
tendering are unknown to the bidder (HIRSHLEIFER and TITMAN [1990])
17CORNELLI and LI [2002] assume that arbitrageurs, who own a non negligible stake, consider themselves as
non-atomistic and are therefore willing to tender at a price below post-takeover share value.
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We conclude by discussing some implications of our model. First, the presence of a large
shareholder has a similar eﬀect to that of a supermajority rule: it increases the fraction of shares
tendered in equilibrium. Moreover, as it reduces the bidder’s profit, a large shareholder acts as an
anti-takeover device. We should therefore expect the presence of supermajority and anti-takeover
devices to be inversely correlated to the presence (and size) of a large shareholder. Another inter-
esting feature of our model is that the eﬀect of a blockholder is not necessarily discontinuous at
50%. Suppose that the incumbent blockholder enjoys large private benefits, making him opposed
to a control transfer. In order to succeed nonetheless, the bidder needs to attract 50% of the shares
from the small shareholders, i.e., bid b∗ = (1 − φ1/2+α)vR. As the incumbent’s stake increases
towards a majority block (50%), the lowest price ensuring success increases towards vR, a price at
which the bidder does not make any profits to recoup the takeover costs. Or putting it diﬀerently,
little happens in our framework when the incumbent’s stake drops somewhat below 50%. Major-
ity blocks and (very) large minority blocks both constitute an insurmountable obstacle to hostile
takeovers.
Second, our model considers unrestricted bids as stipulated by the Mandatory Bid Rule (MBR).
In the absence of the MBR, the bidder would bid b = (1 − φ1/2)vR and restrict his oﬀer to 50%
of the shares. Such an oﬀer would succeed as tendering would be a (weakly) dominant strategy.
This outcome coincides with that under the MBR but in the absence of a “passive” minority
blockholder. Hence, the eﬀects of such a blockholder, highlighted in Section 3, materialize only in a
regime with the MBR. Unless tender oﬀers are unrestricted, the presence of a minority blockholder
never forces the bidder to oﬀer a higher price. With unrestricted oﬀers, a higher price and the
consequent acquisition of more than 50% of the shares may be necessary to simultaneously satisfy
the free-rider condition and secure the blockholder’s support (or attract enough shares from the
small shareholders). Thus, our model implies that the MBR can have a positive eﬀect on target
shareholder wealth, whereas it is immaterial in models with exogenous private benefits.
Finally, consider the impact of deviations from the one share — one vote rule. For simplicity,
assume that there are only two classes of shares - voting and non voting shares — each of them
carrying the same fraction of cash-flow rights. The bidder will only make an oﬀer for the voting
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shares. In the absence of a blockholder, the bidder would try to acquire 50% of the voting shares. In
case of success, the bidder would own 25% of the cash flow rights and would extract higher private
benefits compared to the case of one share — one vote structure. As private benefits come at the
expense of share value, the presence of non voting shares decreases the equilibrium bid. A lower
bid renders, ceteris paribus, the blockholder more reluctant towards the tender oﬀer. Consequently,
deviations from one share — one vote magnify the eﬀect of the presence of a minority blockholder
on the takeover outcome.
22
References
AMBROSE, B. W. and W. L. MEGGINSON [1992], “The Role of Asset Structure, Ownership
Structure, and Takeover Defenses in Determining Acquisition Likelihood,” Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis, 27, 575-589.
BAGNOLI, M. and B. L. LIPMAN [1988], “Successful Takeovers without Exclusion,” Review of
Financial Studies, 1, 89-110.
BEBCHUK, L. A. [1988], “The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy,” pp.
371-397 in: J. C. Coﬀee, L. Lowenstein, and S. Rose-Ackerman (eds.), Knights, Raiders, and
Targets, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York.
- - [1994], “Eﬃcient and Ineﬃcient Sales of Corporate Control,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
109, 957-993.
BRADLEY, M. [1980] “Interfirm Tender Oﬀers and the Market for Corporate Control,” Journal of
Business, 53, 345-376.
BULOW, J., M. HUANG and P. KLEMPERER [1999], “Toeholds and Takeovers,” Journal of
Political Economy, 107, 427-454.
BURKART, M. [1995], “Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests,” Journal of
Finance, 50, 1491-1515.
- -, D. GROMB and F. PANUNZI [1998], “Why Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders,”
Journal of Political Economy, 106, 172-204.
- -, - - and - - [2000], “Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control,”
Journal of Finance, 50, 647-678.
- - and F. PANUNZI [2004], “Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration and Legal Shareholder
Protection,” forthcoming Journal of Financial Intermediation.
- -, - - and A. SHLEIFER [2003], “Family Firms,” Journal of Finance, 58, 2167-2201.
CADSBY, C. B. and E. MAYNES [1998], “Corporate Takeovers in the Laboratory when Share-
holders Own More than One Share,” Journal of Business, 71, 537-572.
23
CHOWDHRY, B. and N. JEGADEESH [1994], “Pre-Tender Oﬀer Share Acquisition Strategy in
Takeovers,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 29, 117-129.
CORNELLI, F. and D. D. LI [2002], “Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers,” Review of Financial Studies,
15, 837-868.
DEMSETZ, H. and K. LEHN [1985], “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Conse-
quences,” Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177.
DYCK, A. and L. ZINGALES [2004], “Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison,”
Journal of Finance, 59, 537-600.
FERREIRA, D., E. ORNELAS and J. L. TURNER [2005], “Ownership Structure and the Market
for Corporate Control,” Working Paper, SITE and U. of Georgia.
GADOUM, Y., L. H. P. LANG and L. YOUNG [2005], “Who Controls Us”, European Financial
Management, 11, 339-363.
GASPAR, J.-M., M. MASSA and P. MATOS [2005], “Shareholder Investment Horizons and the
Market for Corporate Control,” Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 135-165.
GROSSMAN, S. J. and O. D. HART [1980], “Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem, and the
Theory of the Corporation,” Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42-64.
- - and - - [1988], “One Share - One and the Market for Corporate Control,” Journal of Financial
Economics, 20, 175-202.
HIRSHLEIFER, D. and TITMAN, S. [1990], “Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile
Takeover Bids.” Journal of Political Economy, 98, 295-324.
HOLDERNESS, C. [2005], “A contrarian View of Ownership Concentration in the United States
and Around the World”, Working Paper, Carroll School of Management, Boston University.
HOLMSTRÖM, B. and B. NALEBUFF [1992], “To the Raider Goes the Surplus? A Reexamination
of the Free-rider Problem,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategies, 1, 37-62.
KAHAN, M. [1993], “Sales of Corporate Control,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,
9, 368-379.
KYLE, A. S. and J.-L. VILA [1991], “Noise Trading and Takeovers,” Rand Journal of Economics,
22, 54-71.
24
LA PORTA, R., F. LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, and A. SHLEIFER [1999], “Corporate Ownership
Around the World”, Journal of Finance, 54, 471-517.
MANNE, H. G. [1965], ”Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,” Journal of Political
Economy, 73, 110-120.
MIKKELSON, W. and M. PARTCH [1989], “Voting rights and Corporate Control,” Journal of
Financial Economics, 25, 363-290.
NENOVA, T. [2003], “The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: a Cross-country Anal-
ysis,” Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 325-352.
SHLEIFER, A. and R. W. VISHNY [1986], “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,” Journal
of Political Economy, 94, 461-488.
- - and - - [1997], “A Survey of Corporate Governance,” Journal of Finance, 52, 737-783.
- - and D. WOLFENZON [2002], “Investor Protection and Equity Markets,” Journal of Financial
Economics, 66, 3-27.
SINGH, R. [1988], “Takeover Bidding with Toeholds: The Case of the Owners Curse,” Review of
Financial Studies, 11, 679-704.
SONG, M. H. and R. WALKLING [1993], “The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Acquisition
Attempts and Target Shareholder Wealth,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
28, 439-457.
STULZ, R. M. [1988], “Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market
for Corporate Control,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 25-64.
- -, R. WALKLING and M. H. SONG [1990], “The Distribution of Target Ownership and the
Division of Gains in Successful Takeovers,” Journal of Finance, 45, 817-833.
25
